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1 Introduction
When shareholders disagree on the investment policies, control rights over the firm are
very important, and become the stakes of ‘proxy fights’. This is what happens in gen-
eral equilibrium models of production economies where markets are incomplete: agents
(consumers/shareholders) trade assets but, at market equilibria, they typically disagree
on the way to evaluate income streams which lie outside the market span; indeed they
compute them using diﬀerent systems of shadow prices. Hence profit maximization is not
a well defined objective function for the firm1.
Among the ways that have been proposed in the literature to resolve these conflicts
arising at equilibrium, two are compared in the present paper. The first way, proposed by
Diamond (1967), Dre`ze (1974) and Grossman & Hart (1979), consists in allowing sidepay-
ment between shareholders. At equilibrium, there is no alternative investment policy that
makes everybody better oﬀ, even if one allows for sidepayments and transfers between
shareholders2. Dre`ze (1974) bases its argument on eﬃciency grounds and Grossman &
Hart (1979) on competitive behavior. But in all cases, similar criteria are proposed as an
objective for the firm: profit should be maximized with respect to a system of shadow
prices that averages the idiosyncratic shadow prices of all shareholders. The diﬀerence is
that Diamond (1967) and Dre`ze (1974) use the after trade sharehodings to average the
shadow prices, whereas Grossman & Hart (1979) use the initial shareholdings; thus it
depends on whether the manager is acting in the interest of final or initial shareholders.
A second way to resolve these disputes between shareholders is based on majority
voting in assemblies of shareholders. Among others, Dre`ze (1985) and DeMarzo (1993)
propose the same concept of stable production equilibria: they are such that, at equilib-
rium, within each firm, the production plans of other firms remaining fixed, no alternative
production plan can rally a majority of shareholders/shares (depending on whether the
governance is of the ‘one person—one vote’ or ‘one share—one vote’ type) against the status
quo. As Gevers (1974) already noted, the first problem into which this approach runs
is existence: the seminal work of Plott (1967)3 shows that in multi-dimensional voting
models, a simple majority political equilibrium typically does not exist. A way to restore
1For details on standard general equilibrium models of production with incomplete markets and the
role of the firms, see, e.g., Duﬃe & Shafer (1988), Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii & Dre`ze (1990), Magill
& Quinzii (1996) and Kelsey & Milne (1997) as well as more recent studies: Citanna & Villanacci (1997),
Dierker, Dierker & Grodal (1999) and Bettzu¨ge & Hens (2000).
2Grossman & Hart (1979) describes a takeover scheme where a ‘new’ manager, proposing an alternative
investment policy, solicits payments from the shareholders who perceive they derive benefits from the
change to buy proxies from the shareholders who perceive that the change impairs their welfares.
3Developped, among others, by McKelvey (1976, 1979), Schoﬃeld (1978) and Cohen (1979).
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existence is to instore a super majority rule4: to overturn the status quo, a challenger
should rally a proportion bigger than the simple majority of the voting population. The
question then arises of a ‘suitable’ level a super majority, ρ ∈ [1/2, 1]: it should be high
enough to ensure existence, and low enough so that there are not too many equilibria.
The standard way to proceed5 is to associate to each proposal its score. The score of a
proposal (the incumbent, or status quo) is the fraction of the voting population support-
ing, against this proposal, its most dangerous challenger, i.e., the alternative proposal that
rallies the maximal fraction of voters against the incumbent. The most stable proposals
are the ones with lowest score.
The main contribution of the present paper is to set a framework in which the equi-
librium concepts provided by the two above mentioned approaches — the one based on
sidepayments, and the one based on super majority voting — coincide. The model is that
of a finance economy with two periods, S states of nature in period 1, one good in each
state and a continuum of agents. A generic agent is endowed with unrestricted initial
endowments and characterized by a linear-quadratic utility function, as in a standard
version of the CAPM. It happens to be that, under certain condition on the distribution
of primitive characteristics of the agents6, the Dre`ze-Grossman-Hart equilibria based on
sidepayments are stable for the smallest possible rate of super majority, a rate that is
shown to be smaller than 64%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and three equilib-
rium concepts. Section 2.1 provides the setup of the model. In Section 2.2, the central
equilibrium concept is defined and computed; it is the concept of stock market equilibrium
with fixed production plans (Definition 1): firms initially announce production plans, then
agents trade the corresponding assets, and finally an equilibrium price system occurs for
the assets, defining equilibrium portfolios and allocations. The remaining of Section 2
is devoted to identify, among the stock market equilibrium with fixed production plans,
which fullfill the Dre`ze-Grossman-Hart criterion, and which are stable with respect to
super majority voting. In Section 2.3, ownership structures are defined as distributions
of power among shareholders in the corporate control mechanism7; henceforth a first sub-
set, S1, of the set of stock market equilibria with fixed production plans is described
4As proved by, e.g., Ferejohn and Grether (1974), Greenberg (1979), Caplin & Nalebuﬀ (1988, 1991).
5Which dates back to Simpson (1969) and Kramer (1973), often called the ‘min-max rule’.
6The fundamental result of the literature on social choice that is used here is that of Caplin & Nalebuﬀ
(1988, 1991), Balasko & Cre`s (1997).
7E.g., it can be the uniform distribution – as for the ‘one person—one vote’ governance – or the
distribution of shareholdings – as for the ‘one share—one vote’ governance – where the considered
shareholdings are the pre-trade ones – for a governance a` la Grossman & Hart – or the post-trade ones
– for a governance a` la Diamond-Dre`ze.
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(Definition 2): those for which the production plan proposed by each firm fulfills the
Dre`ze-Grossman-Hart criterion, i.e., maximizes profit with respect to the average shadow
prices of the shareholders –where the weights to average shadow prices are given by the
ownership structure. In Section 2.4, a second subset, S2, of the set of stock market equilib-
ria with fixed production plans is described (Definition 3): those which are the stable with
respect to the super majority rule with smallest rate according to the Simpson-Kramer
min-max approach.
Section 3 contains the results of the paper. Section 3.1 provides the main result: the
set, S1, of equilibria that are stable with respect to sidepayments is a subset of the set, S2,
of equilibria that are stable with respect to super majority rules with rates smaller than
64% (Theorem 1), and S1, and thus S2, are not empty (Theorem 2). Section 3.2 yields
conditions under which similar results hold for the simple majority rule (Proposition 1).
Section 3.3 provides some concluding remarks and comments.
2 The Model
2.1 The setup
Consider a finance economy with two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}, and S states of nature in period
1, indexed by s, s ∈ {1, . . . , S} (s = 0 denotes the initial period). There is one good in
each state, and a continuum of agents. A generic agent is endowed with a vector of initial
endowments ω = (ω0,ω1, . . . ,ωS) ∈ RS+1 and has a utility function of the linear-quadratic
type:
u(x) = λx0 +
S3
s=1
πs
w
γxs − 1
2
(xs)2
W
,
where xs is the agent’s consumption in state s; π = (π1, . . . ,πS) is the (common) vector of
objective probabilities over the states of nature at date 1; the vector (λ, γ) ∈ R2++ is the
idiosyncratic characteristics of this generic agent’s preferences. Utility functions are thus
of the mean-variance type and moreover satisfy the assumption of linear risk tolerance
with an identical coeﬃcient of linear risk tolerance.
A generic agent is thus indexed by a vector of primitive characteristics µ = (ω,λ, γ) ∈
RS+1×R2++. LetM ⊂ RS+1×R2++ be the support of the distribution of the agents. We
assume thatM is compact and convex and that agents are distributed overM according
to a continuous density function f . Define M = (Ω,Λ,Γ) ∈ RS+3, the vector of aggregate
characteristics, i.e., such that
∀s :
8
M
ωsf(µ)dµ = Ωs;
8
M
λf(µ)dµ = Λ;
8
M
γf(µ)dµ = Γ.
4
We assume that λ > 0 and γ > max{Ω1, . . . ,ΩS} for all µ ∈M in order to have monotone
preferences on the relevant domain.
There are J firms indexed by j, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Firm j is characterized by its produc-
tion set Yj ⊂ RS+1. These production sets are supposed to be closed and convex, and
moreover the set of eﬃcient production plans (denoted Zj = {yj ∈ Yj|({yj}+RS+1+ )∩Yj =
{yj}}) is supposed to be bounded. Firms are owned by agents. The initial distribution
of shares within firm j is described by a continuous real function δj overM, satisfying
8
M
f(µ)δj(µ)dµ = 1, for all j.
2.2 Stock market equilibria with fixed production plans
Given announced production plans, y = (yj)
J
j=1 ∈
J
j=1
Zj (it is assumed that firms only
announce eﬃcient production plans, and that the yj’s are taken in general position), a
market span Y X, of dimension J , is available for agents to trade in, where Y denotes the
payoﬀs matrix:
Y =


y11 . . . y
1
J
...
...
yS1 . . . y
S
J

 .
Denote ys ∈ RJ the s-th row of the matrix Y , s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, and y0 the vector of
period 0 inputs. Agents trade the J equity contracts, (yj)
J
j=1, at the market prices,
q = (qj)
J
j=1 ∈ RJ . The budget constraint of a generic agent µ who buys the portfolio
θ(µ) ∈ RJ is8:
x0(µ) = ω0 + q · [δ(µ)− θ(µ)] + δ(µ) · y0
xs(µ) = ωs + θ(µ) · ys for all s W= 0 (1)
Each agent maximizes his utility by choosing an optimal portfolio θ(µ) and the corre-
sponding optimal consumption plan x(µ) under the constraints (1).
Definition 1 A stock market equilibrium with fixed production plans (SME(y))
is a vector E = (y, q, x, θ) such that
• given (y, q), for all µ ∈M,
x(µ) = argmax{uµ(x) | ∃ θ : (x, θ) satisfies (1)}
8Whether it is the the initial or final shareholders who pay for the inputs, y0, i.e., whether they are
paid according to the initial or final portfolio, δ or θ, does not make any diﬀerence in the present paper,
as far as the equilibrium concept and results are concerned.
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• the associated optimal portfolio map θ :M→ RJ satisfies
8
M
f(µ)θj(µ)dµ = 1,
for all j.
Fix the following notation: the subscript ·1 under a vector means that only the last
S coordinates (corresponding to period one) are considered. Let Π be the S-dimensional
diagonal matrix with π = (π1, . . . , πS) in the diagonal.
Claim 1 At equilibrium,
x1(µ) = ω1 + Y B(γ1S − ω1 − λv) (2)
θ(µ) = B(γ1S − ω1 − λv) (3)
Duµ(x(µ)) = λ

 1
ΠY Bv

+

 0
Π(I − Y B)(γ1S − ω1)

 (4)
q = vtY B (5)
where B = (Y tΠY )−1Y tΠ and v =
1
Λ
(Γ1S − Ω1 − Y 1J).9
Proof: Standard. See, e.g., Magill & Quinzii (1996), Section 17.
Q.E.D.
2.3 Stock market equilibria
Diamond (1967), Dre`ze (1974) and Grossman & Hart (1979) are important contributions
to the problem of resolving the conflicts arising between shareholders in the context of
incomplete financial markets. These papers define a concept of stock market equilibrium
based on allowing sidepayments between disagreeing shareholders. Within each firm, an
alternative production plan can be proposed to shareholders instead of the status quo;
the fundamental scheme is that of a ‘takeover’ where the ‘new’ manager, proposing the
alternative investment policy, solicits payments from the shareholders who (perceive they)
derive benefits from the change to buy proxies from the shareholders who (perceive they)
derive losses from the change. An equilibrium is such that there does not exist altenative
production plans and a set of transfers between shareholders that makes them all better
oﬀ. Dre`ze (1974) argues on grounds of eﬃciency while Grossman & Hart (1979) argues on
9The matrix Y B is associated with the π-projection on the market span Y X. Of course, for all
w ∈ Y X, Y Bw = w.
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grounds of competitive behavior. But in both cases they show that, at these equilibria,
the production plans chosen by firms are those which maximize profits with respect to the
mean shadow prices of the shareholders. The weights to average shadow prices are the
shares of the final shareholders for Dre`ze (1974) and initial shareholders for Grossman &
Hart (1979).
This naturally leads to the definition, in the present setup, of stock market equilibria
where the production plans chosen by firms are those that maximize profits with respect
to the mean shadow prices of the shareholders for a given ownership structure. The latter
concept consists of a map, η :M→ RJ , whose j’s component, ηj, is a continuous density
onM characterizing the ownership structure within firm j. An intuitive interpretation of
the function is that ηj(µ) is the ‘weight’ given to agent µ in the selection procedure of the
production plan. Thus, it characterizes a mode of governance. Hence this last definition
corresponds to the Dre`ze criterion for η ≡ θ, and to the Grossman & Hart criterion for
η ≡ δ.
Definition 2 Given an ownership structure η, at a stock market equilibrium with fixed
production plans: E = (y, q, x, θ), the mean shadow price vector for firm j is pj(η) ∈
RS+1++ defined by
pj(η) =
18
M
f(µ)ηj(µ)dµ
8
M
f(µ)ηj(µ)Duµ(x(µ))dµ.
A stock market equilibrium for the ownership structure η (SME(η)) is a stock market
equilibrium with fixed production plans, E = (y, q, x, θ), which satisfies:
∀j, yj = argmax{pj(η) · zj | zj ∈ Yj}. (6)
Remarks:
1. Obviously, thanks to Claim 1 (and the linearity of the optimal consumption), given
an ownership structure η, at a SME(y), E , the mean shadow price vector is the
shadow price vector of the mean shareholder defined by the vector of primitive
characteristics µj(η) ∈ RS+3:
µj(η) =
18
M
f(µ)ηj(µ)dµ
8
M
µf(µ)ηj(µ)dµ
i.e.,
pj(η) = Duµj(η)(x(µj(η))).
2. The mean shareholder µj(η) might not be inM.
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2.4 Majority stable equilibria
The aim of the present paper is to relate the latter concept of SME(η) to the one of major-
ity stable equilibrium (see, e.g., Dre`ze (1985), DeMarzo (1993), Cre`s (2000)). Informally,
a SME(y), E , is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium provided that, within each firm, there is
no alternative production plan which is preferred by more than ρ × 100 percent of the
shareholders. A more formal description of the latter concept follows.
Fix a SME(y), E = (y, q, x, θ), and an ownership structure, η, with ηj(µ) ≥ 0 for all j
and µ. Agent µ prefers the challenger zj ∈ Yj over the status quo, yj, all other production
plans, y−j = (yk)k W=j, being fixed, if and only if
uµ(x(µ) + θj(µ)(zj − yj)) > uµ(x(µ)). (7)
LetME(zj, yj) ⊂M be the set of agents satisfying10 equation (7). The relative weight of
agents preferring the challenger over the incumbent is the following:
PE,η(zj, yj) =
8
ME (zj ,yj)
f(µ)ηj(µ)dµ
8
M
f(µ)ηj(µ)dµ
. (8)
Then define the ‘score’ (in a Simpson-Kramer perspective, as explained in the introduc-
tion) of the status quo yj as the relative weight of agents who prefer its most dangerous
challenger:
PE,η(yj) = sup
zj∈Yj
PE,η(zj, yj). (9)
Definition 3 A ρ-majority stable equilibrium for the ownership η (ρ-MSE(η)) is a
stock market equilibrium with fixed production plans, E = (y, q, x, θ), which satisfies:
∀j : PE,η(yj) ≤ ρ. (10)
The last part of this section is devoted to prove that the most dangerous challengers
for the status quo are infinitesimally close to it.
For yj ∈ Zj there exists pj ∈ RS+1+ \{0} such that yj maximizes profits for firm j with
respect to pj. It is a supporting price of yj . Suppose that shareholders can propose
only infinitesimal changes, εtj ∈ pjX⊥, of the production plan yj (where pjX⊥ is the
hyperplane orthogonal to pj); agent µ supports the change (for ε suﬃciently small) if and
only if:
θj(µ)Duµ(x(µ)) · tj > 0. (11)
10For governances a` la Grossman & Hart, where the production decision incurs to the initial share-
holders, we assume as in Grossman & Hart (1979) that agent have competitive price perceptions.
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Forgetting about the measure zero agents (in M) having, at equilibrium, no shares of
firm j, denote LE(tj) ⊂M the set of agents which are indiﬀerent to the change, εtj. It is
described by the equation:
Duµ(x(µ)) · tj = λt0j +Π((I − Y B)(γ1S − ω1) + λY Bv) · tj1 = 0. (12)
Equation (12) is linear in µ. Therefore, at a SME(y), E , for any direction of infinitesimal
change, tj, the set LE(tj) is a hyperplane in M which separates the set of agents who
support the change – denoted L+E (tj) ⊂M – from the set of agents who oppose to it
– L−E (tj). The following lemma (whose proof follows immediately from quasi-concavity
of utility functions) states that the most dangerous challengers, for the status quo yj, are
proposals zj which are infinitesimally close to yj.
Lemma 1 For a given ownership structure η and a fixed SME(y), E,
∀j, PE,η(yj) = sup
tj∈pjX⊥
8
L+E (tj)
f(µ)ηj(µ)dµ
8
M
f(µ)ηj(µ)dµ
.
3 Results
A restricted family of governances is considered here. The governances considered in this
section are of the form:
ηj(µ) =



(θj(µ))
a for θj(µ) > 0
0 for θj(µ) ≤ 0
or ηj(µ) =



(δj(µ))
a for δj(µ) > 0
0 for δj(µ) ≤ 0.
where a is a real number, depending on whether it is based on post-trade or pre-trade
shares. Hence, the classical ‘one shareholder—one vote’, resp. ‘one share—one vote’, gover-
nances are members of the considered family for a = 0, resp. a = 1. Governances of the
first, resp. second, form are denoted θa+ and δ
a
+.
3.1 SME(η) exist and are ρ-MSE(η) for ρ ≤ 1− 1/e.
We restrict the analysis to the case of ν-concave distributions of primitive characteristics.
A density function, g, is ν-concave overM if for all µ, µI ∈M, for all λ ∈ [0, 1],
g((1− λ)µ+ λµI) ≥ ((1− λ)g(µ)ν + λg(µI)ν)1/ν .
This assumption is regarded in the literature (see Caplin & Nalebuﬀ (1988, 1991)) as
imposing some degree of homogeneity in the agents’ primitive characteristics. Notice
9
ν =∞ yields the uniform distribution. Define11 the rate of super majority:
r(α) = 1−
w
S − 1 + α
S + α
WS−1+α
.
Theorem 1 Suppose f : M → R+ is σ-concave, then a SME(η) is a ρ-MSE(η) for
η ≡ θa+ provided that ρ ≥ r(a + 1/σ). Moreover, suppose that {µ|δj(µ) > 0} is convex
and that δj is τ -concave for all j on this set, then a SME(η) is a ρ-MSE(η) for η ≡ δa+
provided that ρ ≥ r(1/σ + a/τ).
Proof: Take a SME(η). Any proposed direction of infinitesimal change tj ∈ pj(η)X⊥ is, by
construction, orthogonal to the price vector with respect to which profit is maximized, i.e.,
orthogonal to Duµj(η)(x(µj(η))). Therefore equation (11) is satisfied for µ = µj(η): hence,
the mean shareholder’s primitive characteristics, µj(η), is on LE(tj) for any proposed
direction of infinitesimal change tj. As a consequence, the hyperplane LE(uj) always goes
through the center of gravity of the distribution of primitive characteristics. Theorem
1 in Caplin & Nalebuﬀ (1991) allows to conclude12 as soon as the relevant distribution
of voting weights is ν-concave over a convex support. It is the case by assumption on
the primitive characteristics for η based on pre-trade shares, δ, because the product of
a σ-concave and a τ -concave distribution is στ/(σ + τ)-concave – see Lemma 2 in the
appendix. For η based on post-trade shares, θ, it follows (i) from the property of linearity
of the portfolio mapping θ which ensures that {µ|θj(µ) > 0} is convex for all j (it is
the truncation by a hyperplane of the convex support M), and; (ii) from the property
of linearity of the portfolio mapping θ, i.e., θ is 1-concave – again see Lemma 2 in the
appendix allows to conclude.
Q.E.D.
Hence, existence of ρ-MSE(η) follows immediately from existence of SME(η), which is
stated in the following theorem (adapted from Dre`ze (1974) for continuous distributions
of agents).
Theorem 2 For all considered governances, a SME(η) exists.
11The ratio r(α) is increasing in α and bounded above by 1− 1/e ≈ 0.632 when α ≥ 2− S.
12In loose terms, the theorem states that there is no way to cut, by a hyperplane, a compact and convex
support endowed with a ν-concave distribution through its centroid so that one of the two resulting pieces
is larger than 100r(1/ν) percent of the weight. The game played is very simple: two players have to share
a ‘cake’ – the supportM endowed with a ν-concave distribution g – the first player indicates a point
in the cake, the second one has to cut the cake by a hyperplane, through the indicated point, as unevenly
as possible and takes the biggest piece; what is left to the first player is the Simpson-Kramer score of the
point he indicated. The point with highest score (the min-max) is the center of gravity of the cake; its
score is 1− r(1/ν).
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Proof: Four consecutive maps are considered: a map from production plans to equilibrium
prices; a map from production plans to equilibrium portfolios and consumption bundles;
a map from production plans to mean gradients of shareholders of firms, and; a map from
production plans to production plans that maximize profits with respect to the shadow
price vectors of mean gradients of shareholders. A fixed point of the map from production
plans to production plans is then shown to exist and to induce an equilibrium with the
desired properties.
“From production plans to equilibrium prices”: Let the map q :
J
j=1 Z˜j → RJ be
defined by
q(y) =
1
Λ
(Γ1S − Ω1 − Y 1J)TΠY
where Z˜j ⊂ Yj is the closure of the convex hull of the set of eﬃcient production plans,
i.e. Z˜j = cl co Zj. Then q : Jj=1 Z˜j → RJ is continuous. Moreover, q(y) is the vector
of equilibrium prices as stated in Claim 1.
“From production plans to equilibrium portfolios and consumption bundles”: Let the
map η :
J
j=1 Z˜j ×M → RJ be defined according to the considered voting governance,
i.e.
ηj(y, µ) =



δa+j(µ)j for governances based on pre-trade shares
θa+j(y, µ) for governances based on post-trade shares
where
θ(y, µ) = (Y tΠY )−1(Y tΠ(γ1S − ω1)− λq(y)t)
and let the map x :
J
j=1 Z˜j ×M→ RJ be defined by
xs(y, µ) =



ω0 + q · (δ − θ(y, µ)) + δ · y0 for s = 0
ωs + θ(y, µ) · ys for s ∈ {1, . . . , S}
Then η :
J
j=1 Z˜j ×M → RJ and x :
J
j=1 Z˜j ×M → RJ are continuous. Moreover,
θ(y, µ), resp. x(y, µ), is the equilibrium portfolio, resp. consumption bundle, as stated in
Claim 1.
“From production plans to mean gradients”: Let the map p :
J
j=1 Z˜j → R(S+1)J+ be
defined by
pj(y) =
18
M
f(µ)ηj(y, µ)dµ
8
M
Duµ(x(y, µ))f(µ)ηj(y, µ)dµ.
Then p :
J
j=1 Z˜j → R(S+1)J+ is continuous.
“From production plans to production plans”: Let the correspondence ζ :
J
j=1 Z˜j →J
j=1 Z˜j be defined by
ζj(y) = {yj ∈ Z˜j|yj ∈ arg max
zj∈Z˜j
pj(y) · zj}.
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Clearly, ζ is upper hemi-continuous and ζ(y) is non-empty and convex for all y ∈ Jj=1 Z˜j.
Hence, there exists y∗ ∈ Jj=1 Z˜j such that y∗ ∈ ζ(y∗) according to Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.
Q.E.D.
3.2 Existence of ρ-MSE(η) for ρ ≤ 1/2.
Consider first the case where financial markets are complete (J = S); then there is
unanimity of shareholders13 and there trivially exists ρ-MSE(η) for all ρ ≥ 0 and any η
such that agents short in the stock of a firm do not have the right to vote. Indeed, in that
case, all gradients (Duµ)µ∈M and supporting price vectors (pj)Jj=1 are positively colinear
to a common vector p; and the technologically possible changes tj are such that p · tj ≤ 0:
tj ∈ pjX⊥ is unanimously rejected by all shareholder positively endowed with shares of
firm j.
The case where either the degree of market incompleteness, or the dimension of the sets
of eﬃcient production plans is one. Then the Dre`ze-Grossman-Hart criterion is not the
most fruitful criterion to extract the equilibria that are stable for the super majority rules
with smallest rate ρ. Indeed, in these cases, a concept of median shareholder naturally
comes to mind and it is possible find equilibria that are stable with respect to the simple
majority rule.
Proposition 1 Suppose that either S − J = 1 or dim Z˜j = 1 for all j then a ρ-MSE(η)
exists for all ρ = 1/2.
Proof: “Case S − J = 1”: If S − J = 1 then the normalized gradients, i.e. the
(1/λ)Dusµ(x(µ))’s, are in a 1-dimensional aﬃne subset of R
S+1
++ . Therefore, the median
gradients of the normalized gradients are well defined and clearly they are upper hemi-
continuous correspondences of production plans. Hence, the proof of Theorem 2 carries
over, with median gradients replacing mean gradients.
“Case dim Z˜j = 1 for all j”: If dim Z˜j = 1 for all j then the set of alternatives is
1-dimensional and induced preferences on the Z˜j’s are convex for all j. Therefore, the
median shareholders are well defined and clearly they are upper hemi-continuous corre-
spondences of production plans. Hence, the proof of Theorem 2 carries over, with median
shareholders replacing mean gradients and utility maximization of median shareholders
replacing profit maximization.
13This absence of disputes between shareholders is also the consequence of the partial spanning condition
developed by Ekern & Wilson (1974) and Leland (1974): firms cannot innovate outside the market span;
it is also observed in some restricted versions of the CAPM –see Magill & Quinzii (1996), Theorem 17.3
(iv).
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Q.E.D.
3.3 Concluding comments and remarks.
It is not possible, within this simple framework, to compare the stability properties of the
Dre`ze versus the Grossman & Hart criteria. Indeed, although Theorem 1 asks for stronger
conditions for a governance a` la Grossman & Hart, i.e., that all initial distributions of
shares be τ -concave, in a sequential version of the model, the initial distribution of shares
of one period is the final distribution of shares of the preceding period, and thus is also
linear, i.e., 1-concave. Hence the relevant rate of super majority rule should be r(a+1/σ)
for both types of governances. On the other hand, r(α) being increasing in α, it is the case
that governances of the ‘one person-one vote’ type yield stable equilibria for smaller rates
of super majority rule: r(1/σ) instead of r(a+1/σ), with a = 1 for governances of the ‘one
share-one vote’ type, although the gain is modest. Hence the temptation to propose a
negative a: this means giving more power to shareholders with fewer shares! The diﬃculty
is that, if some shareholders do not want to be long then the considered equity, a, should
stay strictly bigger than -1, otherwise the weight, in the voting process, of a shareholder
endowed with a shares tending toward zero might not be anymore negligible.
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Appendix
Product of a φ-concave and a ψ-concave distribution
Definition 4 A map, F : K → R+ where K ∈ Rk is compact and convex, is ν-concave
provided that
F ((1− t)a+ tb) ≥ ((1− t)F (a)ν + tF (b)ν)1/ν
for all a, b ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 2 If G : K → R+ is φ-concave and H : K → R+ is ψ-concave. Then F : K →
R+ defined by F (a) = G(a)H(a) for all a ∈ K is ν-concave for all
ν ≤ φψ
φ+ ψ
.
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Proof: It follows from the definition of ν-concavity that if
(((1− t)G(a)φ + tG(b)φ)1/φ((1− t)H(a)ψ + tH(b)ψ)1/ψ)ν
≥ (1− t)(G(a)H(a))ν + t(G(b)H(b))ν
for all a, b ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] then F : K → R+ is ν-concave.
Let g, h : [0, 1]→ R+ be defined by
g(t) = ((1− t)G(a)φ + tG(b)φ)1/φ
h(t) = ((1− t)H(a)ψ + tH(b)ψ)1/ψ
then g is φ-concave and h is ψ-concave. Let f : [0, 1] → R+ be defined by f(t) =
(g(t)h(t))ν then the second-order derivative is
D2f = ν(gh)ν−2((ν − 1)((gDf)2 + (fDg)2) + 2ν(gDf)(fDg)
+fg(gD2f + fD2g))
≤ ν(gh)ν−2((ν − φ)(gDf)2 + 2ν(gDf)(fDg) + (ν − ψ)(fDg)2).
The “≤” follows from the fact that g being φ-concave is equivalent to gφ being concave
so D2gφ = φgφ−2((φ − 1)(Dg)2 + gD2g) ≤ 0 implying gD2g ≤ (1 − φ)(Dg)2 — similarly
for h and ψ.
Finally (ν − φ)(gDf)2 + 2ν(gDf)(fDg) + (ν − ψ)(fDg)2) ≤ 0 for all values of gDf
and fDg if and only if ν ≤ φψ/(φ + ψ). Hence, F (a) : K → R+ is ν-concave for all
ν ≤ φψ/(φ+ ψ).
Q.E.D.
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